We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategyproofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.
Introduction
We analyze bankruptcy problems "with an indivisible object." "Normal" bankruptcy problems consider how to allocate an amount of remaining money among owners of a company that has gone bankrupt according to their claims, such as portions of ownership. A rule is a function that associates monetary allocation with claims. The claims are private information and owners might try to manipulate a rule by reallocating their claims within a group in advance. Hence, one of the main purposes of analyses is to design a rule that is immune to such manipulation. This non-manipulability condition is called reallocation-proofness [Moulin (1985) ].
1
On the other hand, bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object consider how to allocate an indivisible object 2 such as a factory or a company among owners 3 with monetary compensation according to their preferences. Their portions of ownership are public information. A rule is a function that associates object assignment and monetary compensation with preferences. Their preferences are private information and owners might try to manipulate a rule by misrepresenting their preferences. Hence, a primary purpose of analysis is to design a rule that is immune to such manipulation. This non-manipulability condition is called strategy-proofness [Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) ].
4
In addition to strategy-proofness, we study rules satisfying a voluntary participation condition called the ownership lower bound [Dubins and Spanier (1961) and Cramton et al. (1987) ]. Imagine a situation where an owner whose portion of ownership is 30% evaluates the object to be worth $1, 000. When the owner receives compensation less than $300 in spite of giving up his ownership of the object, he does not admit this decision. Similarly, when he receives the object but must pay more than $700, he does not admit this decision. To make him admit the decision of the rule, the rule must make his utility level at least $300. Formally, the ownership lower bound requires that each owner's utility under the rule be at least as much as his value for the object multiplied by his portion of ownership. When portions of ownership are equal among owners, this condition is equivalent to the equal right lower bound [Steinhaus (1948) and Moulin (1992) ].
Bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object have other important applications. For example, consider an "inheritance problem," as follows. An indivisible object is a house left by a parent who has died. Owners might be his wife and children.
5 Their portions of ownership are determined by law, in advance. They must decide who inherits the house with monetary compensation. How should they do so? This is an issue that has caused problems in family estates all over the world.
We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound.
6 Furthermore, this impossibility result is valid on any domains that include at least three common preferences.
7 Thus, it is important to consider other lower bounds or to expand the research scope from deterministic rules to probabilistic rules.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 introduces the axioms. Section 4 states the results. Lastly, Section 5 provides proof.
Model
We consider an environment with a single indivisible object, hereafter called object, and one divisible good called money. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, where we assume n ≥ 2. We denote agent i's portion of ownership for the object by α i ≥ 0, which is public information. Notice that we allow α i = 0 for some i ∈ N .
9 We assume that for at least two agents, their portions of ownership are positive. We call (α i ) i∈N such that ∑ i∈N α i = 1, an ownership profile. Each agent i ∈ N has a preference over bundles consisting of object assignment x i ∈ {0, 1} and monetary assignment m i ∈ R . We assume that this preference is represented by a utility function
Since a preference 10 is identified by v i , we regard v i and V i as the preference and the set of preferences, respectively. We assume that
The set of feasible allocations is
A rule is a function f : Π i∈N V i → Z. Given a rule f and a preference profile
Axioms
We introduce the desirable properties. First, strategy-proofness states that it is a dominant strategy for any agent to report his true preference.
Definition 1. A rule f satisfies strategy-proofness if for any
Next, the ownership lower bound states that each owner's utility under the rule is at least as much as his value for the object multiplied by his portion of ownership.
Definition 2. A rule f satisfies the ownership lower bound if for any v ∈ Π i∈N V i and any i ∈ N , it holds that
, the ownership lower bound is equivalent to the equal right lower bound, defined below. 
10 Notice that we also allow negative valuations.
Results
We state the results. The first result states that no rule satisfies the axioms on domains where agents have three common preferences. The proof is provided in next section.
Theorem 1. Given any ownership profile
Then, there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound.
Since an impossibility result is also valid on larger domains, from this theorem, we immediately have the next result, which states that no rule satisfies the axioms on domains that include at least three common preferences.
Corollary 1. Given any ownership profile
The following corollary is a generalization of Moulin (2010) , who has shown the impossibility on a continuous domain. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We show the first part. The second part is similar, so we omit it here. Let v ∈ Π i∈N V i . Let i ∈ N be such that
Lemma 2. Let f be a rule satisfying the ownership lower bound. Let
Proof of Lemma 2. Let j ∈ N be such that α j > 0 and v j > v i . Suppose, to the contrary, that x i (v) = 1. By the ownership lower bound, we obtain that
and also that, for any k ̸ = i, j,
By summing these inequalities, we have ∑
This contradicts the feasibility. Therefore, we have x i (v) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a rule f on Π i∈N V i satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound. Denote V i = {a, b, c}, where a < b < c. Without loss of generality, we may assume that x 1 (a, a, . . . , a) = 1. Then, by the ownership lower bound, for any i ̸ = 1, it follows that
which means, by the feasibility, that
These are the desired results.
In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that α 2 > 0. b, a, a, . . . , a) = α 2 a.
However, the ownership lower bound requires that
which is a contradiction. Thus, we obtain that
Then, by the ownership lower bound, we have Proof of Claim 5. By the same argument as Claim 3, we obtain that
Then, by the ownership lower bound, we have
Since b < c, by Lemma 1, it holds that
which is the desired result.
Claim 6. For any agent
Proof of Claim 6. Define V * ⊂ Π i∈N V i as follows: , and v 3 , . . . , v n ∈ {a, b}}.
For any ℓ = 0, . . . , n − 2, define V (ℓ) ⊂ V * as follows:
We show this claim by the following induction.
1. For any v ∈ V (0), it holds that x 2 (v) = 1, and that for any i ̸ = 1, 2,
2. If for any ℓ ′ < ℓ and any v ∈ V (ℓ ′ ), it holds that x 2 (v) = 1, and that 
where
Furthermore, by the ownership lower bound, it follows that
and that for any j = ℓ + 3, . . . , n,
We show that x 2 (v) = 1. Suppose, to the contrary that, x 2 (v) = 0. Since, for any i = 3, . . . , ℓ + 2, x i (v) = 0, it means that for some h ∈ {1, ℓ + 3, . . . , n}, x h (v) = 1. Then, by summing the above inequalities, we have
which contradicts the feasibility. Thus, it holds that x 2 (v) = 1. Then, by inequalities (1) and (2), we also have that for
Therefore, this claim is valid. Proof. By Claim 4, for any i ̸ = 1, 2, we have
By Claim 4, we also have
By Claim 5, we have m 1 (b, c, a, . . . , a) ≥ α 1 c.
By Claim 6, for any i ̸ = 1, 2, we have
By summing these inequalities, we obtain that ∑ i∈N m i (b, c, a, . . . , a) ≥ −α 1 b + α 1 c = α 1 (c − b).
If α 1 > 0, then the right-hand side of the above inequality is positive, which contradicts the feasibility. Hence, we must have α 1 = 0. If inequality (3) is valid with a strict sign of inequality for some i ̸ = 1, 2, then this also means a contradiction to the feasibility. Thus, we have the desired results.
Since, by Claim 7, α 1 = 0, in the following, without loss of generality, we also assume that α 3 > 0. Proof. By replacing the roles of agent 2 and agent 3 in Claims 3 to 7, symmetric arguments imply the desired results.
Claim 9. We derive a contradiction.
Proof. Since the object is indivisible, it obviously follows that Therefore, Theorem 1 is valid.
